

Feb 22 - March 4

Company Headquarters

Dawn broke clear and cool on the 22nd--perfect observation for the enemy, which they utilized. Early in the morning, a report reached the CP that three Germans were sighted to the rear of our perimeter, mess gear in their hands. They were quickly taken prisoner and brought to the CP in the center of the small perimeter.

That there were more in the vicinity was soon attested to by the hail of "burp gun" fire that began grazing our position intermittently. The area was dense with small fir trees, making visibility difficult, but not stopping the bullets. Because of this most men stayed pretty close to if not in their holes all the morning. K rations had been brought up during the night and were distributed.

About noon Capt. Kidder, acting as liaison for Col. Conley came down to our position bearing orders for us to withdraw from there, beat our way across the country, thru the resistance we had bypassed the day before, and take our original objective. That this would be nothing short of suicide, trying to fight uphill against emplaced automatic weapons was apparent to Capt. Daley, who refused to follow that route. There was another route of withdrawal known to him and we prepared to pull out, leaving B company in position.

As quickly and stealthily as possible we saddled up and prepared to move out. The grazing fire we were receiving caused a couple of dives for the holes before the move got underway. Sgt. Breen, mortar squad leader, was a casualty just as we started out.

Moving slowly, to scout out the terrain ahead, fearing especially snipers, the column wound up the hill to the left rear of our position. During the climb, a sniper got another man from third platoon.

To everybody's pleasant surprise, the captain led us safely up and around to our proper area, without another casualty or any fir B company had proceeded us on our final objective, clearing the enemy from the ground.

Moving carefully because of mines, especially anti-tank, in the area, we moved down to the position, established an all around defense, and began to dig in. The company forward CP was established in a well built German dugout near the crest of the

hill. The rear CP was still in Behren, where it had remained since the start of the attack.

Our mission was still to cut the Metz road, which we were going to attempt that night. That it was still un use was shown by the sounds of vehicles and horse drawn carts we had heard the night before. Lt. Martinez and his platoon were picked for the mission. Around midnight after a reconnaissance of the ground, he moved his platoon down the slope to the spot. Mines and wire had been brought up to a DP 800 yards to our rear, to which carrying parties were dispatched to bring it up.

After Lt. Martinez had been briefed in his task the forward CP men curled up in the cold to get a little rest. All had gone without sleep for several days and nights, so despite the hard, lumpy and dripping rocks, we sprawled out for a few hours.

In the morning of the 23rd, Capt. Daley and his messenger went back to Etzlinzon, site of the second battalion CP. It wasn't long however, before the captain came out again, dejection on his features and in his walk. He had been relieved of his command.

The new company commander, 2nd Lt. George S. Blanchard, a West Point graduate, and who had been up until then a mortar platoon leader in H company was met out near our positions and taken to the company's forward CP in the cave.

Lt. Martinez' platoon in the meantime had been under tank and small arms fire in their exposed position, so were ordered to withdraw, leaving the road block in place, up the nose to the positions they had held earlier the night before, which was accomplished without a casualty. Lt. Peters, D company HMG platoon leader had been wounded earlier in the engagement and was evacuated.

During the night of the 23rd, a force of Germans had retaken the no to our left for the second time, overrunning and surrounding part of E company, even setting up automatic weapons on top of a pillbox ~~occupied~~ occupied by part of E company and a forward observer party of H company. From our position we had good observation of the action taking place across the draw, so Lt. Blanchard began to zero in 4.2 and 81 mm mortars on the enemy. A number of direct hits were scored including one on the MG nest on top of the pillbox.

No further good could be accomplished there so Lt. Blanchard and Pfc Parker, still CO's messenger, went back to the A company CP, a pillbox 800 yards to our rear where he called the battalion commander.

A runner had just reported in that a tank destroyer, supporting an assault force made up of platoons from several companies was stalled, refusing to cross a small ditch in the road. The new CO passed this info-

formation on, in turn received an order to go out and get it moving. Obeying, he and Pfc Parker went down to the TD's location on a narrow trail-like road, talked to the tank commander and got a promise that the vehicle would move ahead.

On the left flank of the force was a platoon from F company, under Lt. Ebling. The lieutenant had injured his leg so was unable to lead his men, who were covering in their holes. Consequently the officer and man from C company had to run to each hole to get the attack moving again, which they did successfully. After moving 25 yards or so, the TD slipped one track off the trail, but continued firing MG and cannon. By this time however the Jerries had become engulfed in the attack and were surrendering or retreating. Lt. Blanchard subsequently was awarded the Silver Star medal for this action.

The ground there, Spichern Heights, was regarded as a national monument by the Germans, who were determined to hold or retake it at all costs. As our position was quite vulnerable to infiltration and envelopment tactics, being out on a nose alone as it seemed we always were, a thin outpost line was stretched along the left military crest of the hill we occupied, contacting a platoon of B company, which linked us then to B company CP on the left, somewhat strengthening our precarious position. Patrols were also run hourly along the line, as an additional safety measure.

No further trouble was experienced, and the critical night was passed.

The 25th of February we maintained our positions. The period we spent in this location was remarkably free from enemy artillery and mortar fire on our actual positions. A considerable volume of fire, however, was landing down near and to the left of our former roadblock. It was mainly interdicting fire on the Metz road and the road to Etzlingen.

Hot chow was delivered again the night of the 25th, a welcome change in the K ration diet,

The afternoon of the 26th, the situation became critical, a threat that we might be outflanked and cut off loomed as a grave possibility. For this reason, Lt. Blanchard withdrew the company 800 yards to where we could form a better line, tied in physically on our flanks. The Cp moved into a pillbox with B company just behind the line of trenches that we were occupying. A small road junction there had been constantly receiving considerable enemy fire, which continued to pound in intermittently all night. There was one casualty, out of the fourth platoon.

The evening of the 27th we received orders to move, by shuttle to Verbach, about 2 miles away, to take up a reserve position, getting a little rest. The G moved back from Etzlingen during the late afternoon and secured billets for the company. The rest of the company, relieved by part of G company completed the move by midnight.

Recreation and special service facilities were utilized to the limit on the 28th. Showers and clean clothes, the first in many days for many of the men, ~~when~~ were available all day. The regimental band came up and played, and movies were shown. The semi-monthly PX rations, including beer, also came in that day, all these things together giving the men the maximum possible benefit from the short stay.

The morning of the 1st, the company prepared to get back in the fight again in the same area we had left on Spichern Heights. The actual "move" order didn't come out until that evening, and we got underway at 1800.

G company, which had relieved us was in turn relieved, ~~by~~ C company taking over their positions setting up the forward CP in a pillbox on the nose to the right of the one we had held. The rear CP, still maintained by 1st Sgt Williams, set up again in Etzlingen.

Our mission again was holding the line, waiting for units on our right and left to catch up. There was no activity on the 2nd however, except for patrol activity, to determine whether or not our former area had been reoccupied by the Germans. It seemed to be unoccupied, they reported.

Orders were received that night for the company to attack the next morning, our first objective again the same ground where we had set up the road block, in order to flank the village of Golden Brehon, France.

The coordinated attack jumped off about 0830 although we were temporarily out of communication as Sgt Lockfort had gone back to the CP for a new battery in his SCR 300.

The first and third platoons and an attached HMG section only took the route, the second and weapons platoon remaining, in order to make an attack on the village from the hill directly behind it. S-2 reports indicated there were only a few houses there, lightly defended. It turned out, however, that there were 57 buildings and that the Germans there were not completely sold on the idea of surrendering.

Our flanking movement however, started on schedule, G company on our left again, with whom we were to maintain physical contact. That was soon lost, however, and the ~~main~~ CO halted the unit while we sent two small patrols to try and reestablish contact.

In the meantime, the Germans had gotten their mortars ~~perced~~ in

and began dropping them in. Although there were a number of near misses no casualties.

About 1100, the CO moved the company forward again, almost to where our CP had been in that area, then he and his messenger started back to the CP in the pillbox to get further orders on the situation.

On the way, as they approached the road junction just in front of our lines of Feb. 27, a terrific barrage of screening meemies (Nebelwerfer) slammed into the road and trees 50 yards ahead of them. Fortunately a ditch alongside the road afforded cover and neither was hurt.

Soon after noon, the first and third platoons were moved forward again, taking up positions on the right slope of the nose we had previously held, then awaited the frontal attack to be made by the second platoon on the village. At 1600 they came down the slope toward the objective but were met with heavy enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire causing several casualties. It was obvious that the situation was worse than the s-2 reports had stated, so Lt. Connor withdrew his men and brought them around to where the rest of the company was.

Another perimeter defense was organized and plans for another attack before the next dawn formulated.

Since it was apparent that the village was more stoutly defended than we had anticipated, a surprise attack, without artillery or mortar preparation, was planned for the early morning darkness of the fourth. Accordingly, the men were to get as much rest as possible that night, being ready to jump off about 0700.

As H-hour approached, it began getting lighter, through the thin ground haze, a bit earlier than we had figured, so the men were coaxed into greater activity to be able to attack with darkness for concealment.

The plan of attack was for the third platoon to take the buildings on the left side of the Metz road and the second and remnants of the first to work through the more numerous buildings on the right. The fourth platoon stayed where it was covering the approach along the Metz road from the direction of Stiring Wende. The OP with the artillery forward observer party moved down to the very bottom of the nose, where Lt. Martinez' road block had been, where the company commander felt he could best observe and control the operation. With the CO were Sgt. Lockfort, and Pfc's Muzetras and Parker.

Just as daylight began to break the twin columns moved quietly off toward the houses. When the troops were 75 yards out, however, an explosion, followed shortly by two more, disclosed the presence of mines in the area. A man had fallen after each explosion, one foot blown off, so litter bearers were called for.

We were afraid that these explosions had given away the attack, but apparently the enemy had not heeded the warning, for a few minutes later, a German was shot by a third platoon man as he came leisurely out the door and down the steps of a house.

The assault platoons moved quickly into their areas and started "housecleaning". Just about that time artillery fire, which we had called for, as well as German stuff began crashing into the houses. We immediately had our fire lifted but the enemy fire continued to come in occasionally.

The third platoon completed their first objective, a group of buildings and had started down the left side of the road when T/Sgt Ruthven was hit in the face. Lt. Martinez was sick, in the rear, and the platoon guide could not be located, so leaderless, the platoon lost all semblance of concentrated action. At this the CO decided to move the CP down and take personal control of the situation.

Pfc. now came back to lead us thru the minefield. After we reached the platoon's location sniper and artillery fire drove us to cover inside a building, from where we were unable to see or do much of anything.

While we were in there, however, Lt. Blanchard, with a borrowed M1, shot a German trying to crawl away to the next buildings down the left of the road.

Being handicapped in visibility and control, we again returned to the bottom of the hill. Lt. Woods had, in the meantime, gotten the situation well under control and the attack was once more ready to push ahead.

Litter teams had arrived on the scene by this time, but refused to go out into the field and to the buildings to evacuate the wounded. Consequently, the mortar section, and any other men available were called upon to bring the wounded in to a covered rout where the medics waited. Repeated time and again that day, the medical department was foundly cursed, losing in a few hours the high reputation they had built up.

About 1300, it was decided that a flamethrower, which had been attached to us, could be used effectively. As it was at the CP of the night before, we called on the radio for the the operator to bring it down. He was unable, he claimed to carry it because of a strained back, so Pfc Muzetras volunteered to get it and use it in the village. It was found to be defective, so the idea was abandoned.

Having worked their way to the middle of town the forward elements spotted what appeared to be a German artillery observation post. Our own artillery FO called for fire on the spot, directed by Lt. Woods. After several rounds, being unable to hit the target, the guns stopped

firing, because of ammunition shortage.

A platoon from B company had been dispatched from the hill behind the town, for which our men waited, to coordinated with them in renewing the attack. Contact with them, however, was not established until later in the evening, too late to do anything more that night.

That marked the end of the day's offensive activities. Rations and ammunition were brought up by carrying parties to the force in the town. Sgt. Lockfort also laid a telephone line, to end our dependence on 536 radio communication to the town. The CP returned to the cave where it had been before.

Also on this day, the fourth of March, our CO, Lt. Blanchard was promoted to first lieutenant.

The morning of the fifth saw the continuation of the attack, although it meant primarily only occupying the rest of the houses that the enemy had evacuated during the night, and a large amount of souvenir hunting by the GI's.

It was planned to move the company CP back to the pillbox where we had had it several nights previously. To this end, Sgt. Lockfort again started out with his reel of wire to connect the CP with the town. Somehow, having misunderstood the location of another minefield in the area, started through it. About 150 yards up the hill a shu mine exploded, completely taking off his left foot at the ankle. Unable to make his cries for help heard to anyone, for he was alone, he got up and hopped back down on one foot to where Pfc Kenneth Leach, the first platoon medic who seemed to be always in the right place at the right time, heard him and ran to his aid. In a very few minutes the CO also had reached the sergeant, whose first words to him were, "I'm sorry, sir," as though it were his fault that he had been wounded. In spite of the terrible pain, he showed of what strong stuff he was made, never a whimper or cry while his wound was dressed. He was taken to the first platoon CP on an stretcher improvised from a door that T/Sgt Curtis had ripped from its hinges in a nearby house. Later that evening he was evacuated.

To take care of the immediate and pressing need for communications, Pfc Barker was appointed acting commo sgt. As he and the CO started back to the CP, which was to remain in the same place after all, a barrage whistled in, forcing them to take quick cover in a nearby house.

In the meantime, Lt. Dudley, acting to get the CP moved had sent our 300 radio to the pillbox. All telephone lines were also out, isolating us from the rest of the company, and from the rear. Pfc's Barker and Muzetras started out to repair the line to town, as battalion crews worked on the line to the rear. By 2200, we were again in contact all around.

The sixth was a quiet day, as our objective had been taken, again putting us out ahead of units on the right and left. Later in the afternoon, Lt. Blanchard and Pfc Muzetras, who had become CO's messenger, went down into the village, which soon became known as "Blanchardville," and reconnoitered a spot for the OR.

Eleven reinforcements were received on the 6th, bringing our present for duty strength up to 132 men.

The evening of the sixth hot chow was brought up for supper. To get it down to the platoons, carrying parties were organized, Lt. Dudley in charge. Unfortunately, just as the party started out, a rain of mortar shells dropped in scattering the party in every direction, all groping for holes in the pitch black night. After the barrage the party was reorganized, but just as it got moving again, another barrage came, with an enlarged repetition of the previous scattering. By this time, the food containers were scattered over the landscape, as well as the men. It was such a black night that the job was given up, it being impossible to find the men or food again. Two men had been wounded in the last shelling and one, Pfc Kirk, third platoon messenger, had fallen over a small cliff, landing astraddle of a fallen tree. Their wounds

were dressed in the CP, from whence they were evacuated.

On the 7th, enemy artillery dropped a few zebraing rounds into the CP area, then began an earnest shelling for the first time, with stuff of all calibers. That afternoon, however, the CP moved down into the house selected, just about in the middle of the village.

With the move into the town, the company dettled down to enjoy living much more luxuriously than it had since being committed to the fight two months before. All civilians were evacuated and the town was completely ours. With food, too, we were more than well supplied, in the CP most of the time was spent in cooking, -either fixing up the 10-in-1 rations we had for breakfast and lunch or preparing some delicacy the town yielded. The luxury of breakfast in bed as even afforded Charley 5 and 6 frequently. For supper, during the entire time we were there, we had fresh killed meat- chicken, pig or rabbit or goose, and the trimmings, obtained from "local" sources or leftover from the 10-in-1's. Usually, in addition to the CP personnel, T/sgt Curtis, S/Sgt Horton, S/Sgt Bortram and S/Sgt Walker were present for the supper feasts, especially since they controlled the meat source.

Twenty-seven more reinforcements were sent to 1/Sgt Williams at his CP in Btzlingen on the 9th. He loaded them in a jeep and trailer and drove them up himself, to the location of our former CP. However, as we were not allowing vehicles to come down to the town during daylight, they walked the remainder of the distance to the company CP where they were interviewed and assigned to platoons. Pfc Martin Anderson was taken into company headquarters from this group.

Also on the 9th, Col. Conley and Gen. "Task Force" Herron were visitors to "Blanchardville", looking over our positions. As they, escorted by Lt. Blanchard, were crossing a narrow bridge over an anti-tank ditch at the left end of town, a sniper bullet cracked by, not hitting anybody, however.

In spite of our policy not to allow vehicles down during daylight, Sgt. John Nekshes, battalion mess hall center chief and Pfc Mason, battalion messenger, did bring one down that day. We were all apprehensive that it would be followed by a farrage, which did not develop.

A couple of air corps men, looking for a F-47 which had been brought down somewhere in front of us, also brought a staff car down that day, thinking that they could get out to the plane. They didn't.

The tenth, eleventh and twelfth of March were quiet days for us, for the CP there was not much activity. Dispatching patrols about twice a day to our fronts were our main jobs, except for interviewing 5 or 6 German soldiers taken by one of our outposts the night of the 11th.

Engineers were active during the night while we were there, laying mines and barbed wire on the eastern approach to the village. One night they even built a bridge across the two anti-tank ditches on the western end of town.

Company Headquarters  
March 13 to March 20

The 13th was just another day for the company in Blanchardville. Except for occasional patrol clashes with the enemy, we had no actual contact with the Germans, and no fire being received.

The dawn of the 14th showed no promise that it would be anything out of the ordinary, to disturb the peaceful routine that we had established in our stay in Blanchardville. Before the day was very old, however, we began to revise our opinion; for the the Jerries had suddenly began to drop barrage after barrage of 80 mm mortar into the town and the hill immediately behind it. At first we were under the impression that the fire was brought about by some of the men moving around on the hillside in view of the German positions, in the process of evacuating some civilians, who had been hiding there since the attack had started. Long after the men had regained the safety of the CP, the fire was continuing, now and then, augmented, by long range machine gun fire into our houses. Another impression that we held at the time was that the enemy was laying in a preparation for a counterattack, for which we were alert.

Wire communications were knocked out early by the constant barrages, both to the rear, with battalion, and forward to our outpost in a big German cemetery to our front. Because of the importance of the outpost, in case of enemy attack, communication with them was vital, so they were provided with a SCR 536 radio, and one was opened in the CP to maintain contact.

With battalion, also SCR 300 radio contact was established, in line with our policy of opening the radio if telephone lines were knocked out. In the afternoon, when the shells seemed to be coming in a little less frequently Pfc's Parker and Muzetras started out to repair the battalion line. They had only gone a short way, when the rounds began falling again, knocking more holes in the line. It seemed futile to try and repair the line with that much fire hitting it, so they returned to the CP. They did manage to repair the line to the outpost, which had sustained four direct hits in 50 feet of its length. Later in the day, however, a battalion wire crew working from the rear, and us working from the front end did get the line in.

It soon became apparent that the day's firing by the enemy was laid down to cover a withdrawal by them. Consequently, the first battalion was to be pulled out and take off after them, hitting them before they had a chance to set up a defensive line. Accordingly, the company was relieved by another outfit and we prepared to pull out. At 2100, the company commenced to move, by foot, down the Metz Road to Styring Wendel. At first the CP was set up in a house just off that road, about an hour later it was moved over into the CP held by A company, as they had received orders to push on, through Alt Styring, and on through as far as they could go.

About 2300 we received orders to push off behind A company into Alt Styring Wendel. A quartering party was sent out ahead, including Pfc Garhard Senart from company headquarters, to secure billets.

Communication was going to be a problem, with the situation as fluid as it was. To try and maintain wire communication, Pfc's

Parker, Muzetras, Newal Willingham and James T. Roberts, loaded themselves down with reels of wire and started out after the advancing company. Because of the tortuous route negotiated, steep hills, a railroad cut and so forth we had grave doubts that the line would function, but after we reached billets we found we were able to reach the battalion operator, a great relief. We had left several reels of wire back at the CP, which Sgt-Williams was to maintain in Styring Wendel, so Pfc Senart and Roberts went back to bring it up for the probable advance the next day. The line went out about 0700 on the 15th, so from there on we had to again rely on the radio.

Lt. Blanchard received orders to start the company out again about 0900, following the route that A company had taken during the night, through Habsterdick, and up on the high ground overlooking the Saar River and Saarbrücken.

The company got under way again, advancing over a mile through and past Habsterdick, until it reached an old cement mill. There the CO halted the company and held a council of war on our next move.

In the meantime, Pfc Parker and Muzetras had started out behind the company to keep wire contact up. They soon ran dangerously short of wire and, observing that they were following the same route of the A company wire, stopped laying it and caught up with the company.

The point where the company had halted was at the present "wire head" of A company, so Pfc ~~Roberts~~ Thomas J1 Kirk was left there to await the delivery of more wire. Pfc Graybill and Senart were sent back to reel up as much of the wire that we had laid that morning and the night before, and bring it up.

We had captured a German prisoner early that morning, a mere kid, just seventeen years old. Because we had no facilities to take care of him, we took him with us, using him as a pack-horse for our signal equipment, of which we were carrying a large amount.

From the cement mill, the company took to the woods, over some pretty rough terrain, following a narrow trail through the brush. Pfc Muzetras had spliced what wire we had left, and laid it along behind the company.

We advanced another three quarters of a mile to a line of abandoned German trenches, which we temporarily occupied, since we were not far behind A company at that time. The wire ran out at that point, so a couple of men were left there to guide the wire party on up when they reached that position.

From there, we took off, two platoons abreast, moving up another 500 yards until we made physical contact with A company. It was getting pretty late in the afternoon by that time, so plans were made for us to occupy the ground we held, more or less along the Railroad track.

The company CP was established in another dugout that the Germans had left, complete with stove and mattresses, right near the tracks. Sgt Williams moved the rear CP up into the town of Habsterdick, also that evening.

Early the next morning, the 16th, a lot of fire to our left and front announced a counterattack which seemed to be centered on the B company front to our right.

Company Headquarters  
March 19-25

In the morning of the 20th, Lt. Blanchard, Lt. Smith, FO, Lt. Swettser, MG leader, and Pfc Kirk started out to the high ground on beyond our right flank. Thinking that they could get good observation on the enemy positions there, they cautiously approached the spot when bullets began to crack around them. Lt. Swettser maintained that our own men were firing, but it put the party on edge and they returned, without reaching the destination. It turned out on later investigation, however, that the firing had come from our men in Sgt. Walker's squad.

Word had come down that that night was to be the big night-- the Saar River was to be crossed. The order of crossing put us as the reserve, the last infantry battalion in the division to cross. Even at that we began sweating it out, picturing ourselves crossing in assault boats in a hail of fire.

The entire western front had started a grand offensive action, and to keep up with the situation it was necessary for us to take measures to insure that we remained in contact with the enemy. Consequently, that evening a number of bazooka teams were sent out to fire white phosphorus at the German lines, to stir up a little action if the enemy was still there.

They were there, all right, for we soon received a report from a company that a German patrol was moving down the tracks in our direction. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down there, to halt the patrol, which it did. For a few minutes, we were afraid that we had fooled with a hernets nest, and were about to get stung for our trouble, but soon the activity stirred up by the bazookas subsided.

A long ways to our left we could hear the artillery, mortars and heavy machine guns preparing for and supporting the crossing of the river. We were prepared to move out on a moment's notice if necessary to aid in the crossing, but the order never materialized. Instead, about 0300, Lt. Dunbar, S-2, sent a message that they thought that the enemy had evacuated the pillboxes to our front. About 0530 we checked with the platoons ~~xxxx~~ who said that they had not heard any firing for about an hour. From midnight on, too, a considerable amount of artillery and mortar fire had plopped into our lines. From previous experiences along that line, we decided that that fire was covering a withdrawal, accordingly the CO decided to send a patrol out to see if the pillboxes were still occupied. The patrol, led by T/5 Prejean of the second platoon, returned shortly after 0600. Having entered six of the pillboxes and found them vacated, they decided that the enemy had pulled out completely. That information was transmitted to battalion, in return we were ordered to move the company forward, past the line of forts, and on to the high ground just west of the Saar, from where we could see all of the city.

About 0800 the company moved out, in pretty good spirits that we were to get through the Siegfried Line there so easily. The company, in a columns of platoons, with small detachments inspecting each fort, moved forward, skirting the line almost to the Metz road, then wheeling left up onto the high ground. Five prisoners surrendered to the third platoon on the way up; one of them, a corporal, volunteering to lead the way through the bobby-trapped and mined areas.

The position was occupied without a single casualty. A company had also displaced forward on our left and joined us there.

Lt. Smith, our artillery forward observer could plainly see the mass German evacuation taking place out of Saarbrücken--everything was leaving--tanks, infantry and horse drawn artillery. Just as he got his radio set up and prepared to fire on the massed target, we were ordered to withdraw from the position, and march back to Habsterdick, for the third battalion of the 275th Infantry was coming up to relieve us.

The march back to our former CP and then on to Habsterdick was accomplished without incident. There, where Sgt. Williams had the rear CP, and Sgt. Schneider had the supply room, we stopped and were issued hard rations and gas masks.

Lt. Blanchard went to meet the battalion CO and get our new mission, which was to cross the river and fan out, securing the bridgehead, while the outfits that had crossed earlier pursued the enemy.

C company started out on foot for its destination, Rockershausen, Germany. We were soon picked up by trucks, however, and reached there about 1800. There our former mission was cancelled and we selected billets awaiting orders, not knowing whether we would be there 5 minutes, 5 hours or 5 days, although the second choice was considered most likely. We were informed that in all probability we would be formed into a task force, with cannon company attached and take off in pursuit of the Germans, on the DUKW's that had been brought up for the purpose. The company was in corps reserve at this time.

Surprisingly little resistance had been met by the assault battalions, by this time they were so far away that we were rear echelon troops. Consequently, the men settled down to rest, for it looked as though we would not be able to contact the enemy again at the speed that they were moving out.

Eleven new reinforcements were received, and three old men were returned to the unit on the 22 of March. Two of the new men, Pfc. Paul B. Blakeslee, Jr. and Pfc. Darrell L. Casper were taken into company headquarters as messengers. These men swelled the present full duty strength of the company to 175 men, nearly the full strength of the unit.

The morning of the 23rd, the company prepared to move from Rockershausen to Fredrickstal, Germany, a distance of twelve miles. At first it was presumed that we would have to walk, for all available transportation was out chasing the Germans. At the last minute, a few trucks were found and the companies were shuttled.

The company was removed from corps reserve on the 23rd and placed into Seventh Army reserve. Also on the the same day, Lt. George E. Dudley, company executive officer received notice of his appointment to the grade of 1st Lt., effective ~~the~~ as of the 16th of March.

The company moved into new billets; the platoons took up several guard posts on the roads leading into town, and also started some house to house searching. The CP had a good setup, on the second and last day that they spent in Fredrickstal they got the hot water system in operation and all, except Lt. Dudley who was away on a quartering party, got a bath.

Early the morning of the 25th the company received orders to proceed by motor to the town of Otterbach, Germany, and take up new billets. The move, a distance of 45 miles, was begun at 0730 and completed at 1130. Lt. Dudley, and Pfc's Roberts, Senart and Eyer, the driver, had left the day before and selected the billets, where they stayed all night. Lt. Earl P. Hargrave, who had just been commissioned a second lieutenant, also accompanied the party.

The company arrived in the town and took up the billets. There was no particular job that the men had to do, so they combed the town for souvenirs. Also a number of automobiles were picked up. The company spent the night there and prepared to move on the next day.

1st Lt. George S. Blanchard, company commander, had been promoted to the grade of captain, effective as of the 21st of March, although he did not receive notification until a number of days later.